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The role of historiography in Fichte’s Grundzüge
1. Introduction. The statute of historicity
This paper sets out as its objective the exploration of some of the key 
passages and most relevant theoretical plexuses of the Grundzüge 
des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters1 by Johann Gottlieb Fichte devoted to 
the theme of historical narrative and, more generally, of historio­
graphy.
In particular, we will first of all aim to show the specific status 
of Historie according to the dictates of GZ, which will force us to re­
fer, if only impressionistically, to other Fichtian works in which this 
issue is addressed. Secondly, we will try to outline the differences 
that GZ establishes between the functions of Wissenschaftslehrer 
and those of’ Historiker (historian), in an attempt to show, at the 
same time, the nexus linking the two and the activities they perform.
As has been underlined by many voices of Fichte ‑Forschung that 
idea of Geschichtsphilosophie constantly recurs, albeit in different 
ways and with different intensity, among the interests of Fichte.2 It 
1 Further: GZ, 1806.
2 See R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, Bolo­
gna 2009, pp. 62 ss.
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can not, after all, be forgotten that the thinker of Rammenau came 
on the public scene, after the Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung 
of 1792, with the two much debated Revolutionsschriften3: their nu­
cleus was built on a discussion of the event of the French Revolution, 
in a perspective in truth oriented to comprehend its import – eval­
uating its legitimacy and wisdom – more than proposing a specific 
place in the order of Weltgeschichte.
As argued by, among others, Giannino Di Tommaso in his im­
portant study Doctrine of science and the genesis of the philosophy 
of history in early Fichte4 (1986), the very structure of the Wissen‑
schaftslehre praxologische Dialektik5 presents its inescapable re­
lationship with the philosophy of history; a relationship which on 
Marco Ivaldo convincingly insisted, arguing that “the ethic infinite 
is the opening of a history of liberty,”6 which is a series of indeduc­
ible actions, according to the order of time, corresponding to the ef­
forts that reason expends to fully realise itself, to make sure every­
thing correspond to it.
Thus, still in the words of Ivaldo, “history is the formation of free­
dom over time according to the idea.”7 It corresponds to that “Cre­
ative formation which comes into being and accretes, mediating the 
interpersonal accomplishment of the task of freedom in time,”8 con­
figuring itself as a process in which the “I” increasingly corresponds 
to the “non ­I” and becomes more and more aware of its own desti­
nation and its true authentic nature as indivisible subject paradox­
ically existing in the fragmentation of the I empirical. The practical 
activity of the “I” is determined by concrete historical objectifica­
tion along the mobile axis of history, breathing life into history as 
the history of freedom.
3 See M. Buhr, Revolution und Philosophie: die ursprüngliche Philosophie 
 Johann Gottlieb Fichtes und die französische Revolution, Berlin 1965, pp. 15 ss.
4 See G.V. Di Tommaso, Dottrina della scienza e genesi della filosofia della sto‑
ria nel primo Fichte, L’Aquila 1986.
5 See K. Hammacher, Fichtes praxologische Dialektik, “Fichte ­Studien” 1 (1990), 
pp. 25–40.
6 M. Ivaldo, Libertà e ragione. L’etica di Fichte, Milano 1992, p. 190.
7 M. Ivaldo, Libertà e ragione. L’etica di Fichte, op. cit., p. 304.
8 M. Ivaldo, Libertà e ragione. L’etica di Fichte, op. cit., p. 303.
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In this perspective, the GZ can rightfully be considered as the 
most mature and aware expression of Geschichtsphilosophie, with 
respect to which the self ­same Staatslehre (along with its import­
ant development of this theme) should be read in continuity. The 
GZ is configured, in fact, as the work on which the Fichtean phi­
losophy of history must be measured, and this not only because it 
is the only monographic text dedicated to it, but also because, for 
the first time, the thinker of Rammenau is not limited to episod­
ic considerations or developing impromptu reflections on the pres­
ent, but constructs rigorously, a priori, on real historical topology, 
a precise fixing of Weltgeschichte, always understood – in line with 
the WL, in a framework uncontradicted by the presence of a Welt‑
plan – as a series of free objectifications of human freie Wirksam‑
keit.9 This historical topology, as pointed out by Carrano,10 was ac­
tually the true aspect missing in previous Fichtian elaborations on 
the philosophy of history.
The main objective that the GZ responds to seems, then, to be 
two ­fold. Fichte aims, on the one hand, to describe the present, 
emphasising in an unsweetened form all its major contradictions, 
and contextualizing it within the framework of Weltgeschichte and 
its five epochs deduced a priori from speculative reason. On the 
 other hand, in a convergent way and always in line with the dic­
tates of WL, the thinker of Rammenau aims to awaken his contem­
poraries from the torpor that causes in them a fatalistical, dogma‑
tisch, acceptance of the age’s “accomplished sinfulness” (vollendete 
Sündhaftigkeit) as, if you will, inescapable destiny, or as the per­
fect realization of human egotism, summarized in the axiomatic 
of do ut des.11
9 See S. Azzaro, Politica e storia in Fichte, Milano 1993, pp. 44 ss.
10 See A. Carrano, La storia come progresso e come ritorno, [in:] J. G. Fichte, 
Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1806, [in:] Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften [further: GA], Hrsg. R. Lauth, H. Jacob, Stuttgart–
Bad Cannstatt 1962 pp., I, 8; transl. in italian by A. Carrano, I tratti fondamentali 
dell’epoca presente, Milano 1999, pp. 22 ss.
11 See our essay La compiuta peccaminosità. La critica della società capitalisti‑
ca nei “Grundzüge” di Fichte, in “Filosofia Politica” 1 (2013), pp. 97–116.
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In GZ, the description of the present sinfulness and all the fun­
damental milestones that punctuate the Weltgeschichte are still con­
nected to, and, strictly speaking, subordinate to the requirement 
that dictates them as a moral task, so that the “cosmic plan” can be 
fulfilled and all relationships can unfold according to freedom and 
reason: the action stretching out to a transcendence of today and to­
ward a pre ­intended future.
Now, in view of the fact that they deal with the past also­ pre­
cisely what was missing in the previous texts ­the GZ cannot evade 
the inherent question of the theoretical relationship that binds his­
torians to philosophers.12 It is, we must point out, a subject that, in 
truth, was already mentioned in other writings, but only here be­
came central; to the point that Fichte insists on it several times, in 
several passages scattered throughout different Vorlesungen of GZ.
In particular, in the system of the GZ, Fichte’s requirement un­
der in the fourth Jena lesson on Bestimmung des Gelehrten 1794 is 
 satisfied: the Gelehrter, ‘scholar’, was called to unite a virtuous, pure­
ly theoretical (philosophical) knowledge with the empirical (histori­
cal), seeking a fruitful synthesis between the two, i.e. a philosophical­
­historical knowledge. More precisely, the intellectual Gelehrter 
should possess – so say the Jena lessons on the scholar – a philo­
sophical (a priori) knowledge of the needs of humanity as well as 
a philosophical and historical knowledge of the concrete means to 
satisfy them; as well as, finally, a historical knowledge that makes 
one aware of the past, the empirical data underpinning human prog­
ress which is taking place thanks to the concrete act of Gelehrter 
as an instructor of mankind.13 The passage of the Bestimmung des 
Gelehrten of Jena is worth quoting in its entirety:
The first kind of knowledge is based on mere rational and philosoph­
ical assumptions; the second is based partly on experience and is, there­
12 See M. Ivaldo, Zur Geschichtserkenntnis nach der Transzendentalphilosophie, 
“Fichte ­Studien” 6 (1994), pp. 303–319.
13 C. Asmuth, Metaphysik und Historie bei J.G. Fichte, “Fichte ­Studien” 
23 (2003), pp. 145–158.
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fore, the history of philosophy (philosophisch ‑historisch) (not only his­
torical, since the aims of this in any case could give only philosophical 
knowledge, I have to put them in connection with the objects experi­
ence gives me, so as to be able to consider the latter as a means to meet 
these purposes). This knowledge has to benefit the community (diese 
Kenntniss soll der Gesellschaft werden nützlich); then, it is not a mat­
ter of knowing, in general, what are the rules of man as such, and in 
what manner he can deploy them, because such knowledge would still 
always completely devoid of results. It has still to advance one step in 
order to be of benefit in concrete terms. We need to know what specif­
ic cultural level a given historical moment is at, the company of which 
you are a member, to which higher level it will rise and what instru­
ments it can use in view of this objective. Well, certainly we can, mov­
ing from rational principles and taking as a prerequisite experience in 
general, the way to measure the human race, regardless of any specific 
experience. You can report in a truly approximate way the individual 
program and how much further that it will have to go before they reach 
a specific cultural stage. However, reporting the degree to which man­
kind has actually progressed at a certain moment in history is impossi­
ble it is moving only by rational principles. In this respect, it is neces­
sary to resort to experience, you have to analyse the events of the past, 
but with a gaze made more acute by virtue of philosophy (aber die Stoves 
angeben, auf welcher es in einem wirklich bestimmten Zeitpuncte stehe, 
das kann man schlechterdings nicht aus blossen Vernunftgründen; da‑
rüber muss man die Erfahrung befragen, man muss die Begebenheiten 
der Vorwelt – aber mit einem durch Philosophie geläuterten Blicke – er‑
forschen). You should look around and scrutinize your contemporaries. 
This last section of the knowledge essential for the company is there­
fore uniquely historical.14
As will be supported in his next Sittenlehre of Jena of 1798, “the 
intellectual, on the one hand, must know the subject of the culture 
14 J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, 1794, 
[in:] J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke [further: SW], ed. by I.H. Fichte, Berlin 1845–
1846, VI, p. 326.
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of his time, and on the other must develop it,”15 virtuously merg­
ing the three types of knowledge outlined in the lessons of Previous 
Bestimmung des Gelehrten.
You can, then, legitimately maintain that the GZ, for their part, 
aspire to achieve the “philosophical ­historical” knowledge thema­
tised in lessons on the scholar of 1794, transcending the empir­
ical historical without depreciating it and, indeed, substantiating 
the a priori vision by putting it to use, that is, to show its stamp 
on the plane of concrete happening in which historical experience 
is condensed.
Moreover, the GZ, reclaiming the partition coded Bestimmung 
des Gelehrten of Jena, conduct a more careful and reasoned distinc­
tion between the tasks and the method of the philosopher and those 
of the historian, highlighting how the two figures should have a co­
operative relationship: The first traces a priori a framework of his­
torical development, deducing from the principles of reason steps in 
which the Weltgeschichte must be articulated in order to reach its 
telos. The second role, meanwhile, involves adeptly collecting and 
cataloguing the empirical material, to provide the first with concrete 
material with which to corroborate the a priori vision.
The philosopher is called – so says the Bestimmung des Gelehrten 
of Jena – to fix in place the telos of historical development, deduc­
ing from a priori principles of reason: this goal – says Fichte in the 
passage earlier cited – “may only be a philosophical knowledge,”16 
where the empirical facts catalogued by the historian are only “tools 
to meet these objectives.”17
Now, if philosophical reason may indicate the telos, and the steps 
you need to take to achieve it (making possible ipso facto that a  priori 
periodization of history thematized in GZ), it, nevertheless, is not 
able to report, alone, at what stage of development we actually find 
ourselves, in the present state. In the words of the Bestimmung 
des Gelehrten of Jena, if “we need to know which specific cultural 
15 See J. G. Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, 1798; GA, I, 5, p. 303.
16 SW, VI, p. 326.
17 SW, VI, p. 326.
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level a given historical moment is at, the company of which you are 
a member,”18 well, this knowledge cannot be inferred a priori, but 
must be extrapolated from careful study of empirical reality.
It cannot, in other words, be the subject of philosophical specu­
lation, but must be obtained from the empirical analysis of its real 
history. In fact, “to report the degree to which mankind has actual­
ly progressed at a certain moment in history is impossible moving 
only by rational principles”19: these can only “chart the course the 
human race, regardless of any specific experience.”20
Hence, in fact, the need, scattered throughout since 1794, to 
“make use of experience,”21 to “analyse the events of the past”22 and 
to “look around and scrutinize their contemporaries.”23 This type of 
knowledge corresponds precisely to historical knowledge, the pre­
cise classification of events and accurate representation of reality.
The GZ remain faithful to this program, entrusting to the his­
torian the task of exact chronological evenemential description, so 
that then the philosopher can, on that basis, understand at what 
stage of development weltgeschichtlich, outlined a priori, humani­
ty lies:24 it is what, in fact, in the system of the GZ, allows the Wis‑
senschaftslehrer to label the present time as a time of ‘accomplished 
sinfulness’, and therefore to fix precisely the epoch in which human­
ity is projected in the current state.
As already explained in the Bestimmung des Gelehrten, and as 
now taken up by Fichte in GZ, there is no way to catalogue the 
present time if not relying on its empirical description, with recourse 
to the support of historians25. Only in this way will it become possi­
18 SW, VI, p. 326.
19 SW, VI, p. 326.
20 SW, VI, p. 326.
21 SW, VI, p. 326.
22 SW, VI, p. 326.
23 SW, VI, p. 326.
24 H. Heimsoeth, J.G. Fichtes Aufschliessung der gesellschaftlichgeschichtlichen 
Welt, Torino 1962, pp. 33 ss.
25 J. Navarro ­Pérez, Fichte, Humboldt y Ranke sobre la idea y las ideas histori‑
cas, “Anuario Filosofico” 30 (1997), pp. 405–426.
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ble to determine incontrovertibly in which of the five eras outlined 
a priori we are at the present time.
In light of this albeit cursory traversal of the decisive passages 
from Bestimmung des Gelehrten of Jena dedicated to the delinea­
tion of tasks between philosophers and historians, it becomes pos­
sible to argue that the GZ are structured exactly in accordance with 
the principles outlined in broad terms in 1794.
They take up that distinction and result in an in actu a priori vi­
sion making use of empirical knowledge provided by the work of the 
historian to decipher the actual stage in which humanity is project­
ed and, therefore, to envisage an escape route out of it, entrusting 
it to the free will of finite rational entities guided by the education­
al work of the scholar.26 Knowledge of historical fact makes it em­
pirically visible in the eyes of the philosopher that the present in 
which he thinks and acts is the time of vollendete Sündhaftigkeit.
The historicizing of the gaze is a subject on which the GZ in­
sist thoroughly. They, on the one hand, draw attention to the fact 
that only historical knowledge can permit the a priori gaze of the 
philo sopher to understand which age humanity actually inhabits 
at the present time.27 and on the other hand, they point out that 
only the historicizing perspective, and thus the showing of how the 
existing reality has its own history and is the outcome of a process 
punctuated by practice and possibilities, it becomes possible to criti­
cize in the fullest sense the present by relating it as much to the 
past as to the future, and thereby reopening the sense of the possi­
bility for transforming action.
It is not, in fact, possible to criticize the accomplished sinfulness 
of the present by “a vision from the perspective of this time,”28 ex­
plain the GZ. As long as you remain imprisoned by this view you 
cannot understand the contradictions: we are led to live it as a nat­
26 See P. L. Oesterreich, Die Einheit der Lehre ist der Gelehrte selbst. Zur per‑
sonalen Idee der Philosophie bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Fichte ­Studien” 16 (1999), 
pp. 1–18.
27 I. Radrizzani, Quelques réflexion sur le statut de l’histoire dans le système 
fichtéen, “Revue de theologie et de philosophie” 1991, pp. 293–304.
28 GA, I, 8, p. 385.
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ural way of life, sensing its contradictions as if they were natural 
and eternal, not historically determined. As expressed in the second 
Vorlesung of GZ, “of the present epoch we can speak only in view of 
the present epoch,”29 ending up, therefore, necessarily sanctifying 
it and fulfilling the function of the apologist.
For this reason, it is necessary, once again, to historicize the 
gaze projecting retrospectively to past ages and prospectively to fu­
ture generations, so that today, far from being a standard to mea­
sure itself against, would be commensurate to other historical situ­
ations. As clarified in the second Vorlesung of GZ in relation to the 
present time, “no one who is not already beyond can characterize 
or can conceive a feature of the same.”30
It is because of these considerations that science, of which philos­
ophy must be the standard bearer “transcends all time and eras, as 
it encompasses a time and equates it to itself as the superior foun­
dation of all times, subjecting them to its free interpretation,”31 and 
therefore intends the present not as the completion of history (nei­
ther as its aim-’end’ nor as its finish-’end’), nor in the dogmatic man­
ner as merely a given reality, natural and eternal.
The gegenwärtige Zeitalter corresponds, instead, to the point of 
passage in preparation for a redeemed future, finally marked by 
free relations, according to reason on a universal scale, such as to 
show this present for what it really is, a time of ‘accomplished sin­
fulness’.32 It is also for this reason that the GZ, consistent with the 
praxologische Dialektik of the WL, do not just describe history in its 
tripartite division of past, present and future, but with descriptive 
elements of instances with highly prescriptive associations, aimed 
at ensuring that Vernunftwesen take action, and can finally realize 
the “cosmic plan” of history as a history of salvation.
29 GA, I, 8, p. 211.
30 GA, I, 8, p. 211.
31 GA, I, 8, p. 203.
32 See J. Heinrichs, Die Mitte der Zeit als Tiefpunkt einer Parabel. Fichtes 
Geschichtskonstruktion und Grundzüge der gegenwärtigen Zeitenwende, “Fichte­
­Studien” 23 (2003), ff. 175–189, pp. 175–189.
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2. Duties of the historian and duties of the philosopher
It will be necessary to further clarify the specific status the Ram­
menau thinker assigned to history, as well as the distinction of tasks 
between historians and philosophers which is outlined – along the 
fundamental lines set down in Bestimmung des Gelehrten of Jena – 
in the Vorlesungen 1804–1805.
We know that, in the pages of GZ, Fichte gives history a definite 
place in the context of WL as System der Freiheit.33 Knowledge, in 
his opinion, is set out into “empirical” and “a priori.” In turn, how­
ever, the empirical knowledge differs in two fundamental ways: his­
torical and physical. As for history, it falls to all intents and pur­
poses, in the view of Fichte, into empirical knowledge, like physics, 
from which it also differs profoundly.
As suggested by Picardi,34 some passages of the nodal GZ are, in 
fact, devoted to the clarification of the relationship and dif fer ences 
between physics and history as parts of empirical knowledge35: phys­
ics deals with nature, which is “object eternally to equal to itself,”36 
taking shape more precisely as “subsistent objective unity.”37 His­
tory, in turn, corresponds to the “unitary concept” of the earthly life 
of mankind, and presents itself, therefore, as a “concept of a prede­
termined fulfilment (Erfüllung)”38 of time.39
Elsewhere Fichte writes in the text that history is the “Science 
of the cascading event,”40 having as its object unrepeatable sensory 
impressions, ultimately spent, asking to be sent to those who have 
had no opportunity to get into direct contact with them. In the ninth 
Vorlesung of GZ, Fichte says, in a convergent way, that “such a his­
33 GA, I, 8, f. 297.
34 See R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
pp. 32–33.
35 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
pp. 32–33.
36 GA, I, 8, f. 297.
37 GA, I, 8, f. 297.
38 GA, I, 8, f. 197.
39 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., p. 32.
40 GA, II, 9, f. 145.
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tory a priori, just as the philosophy of nature […] strives to find an 
a priori physics,”41 that is, general laws that allow for the under­
standing and contextualization of the empirical level of happening.
Following the discussion of Fichte, it could probably be  argued 
that history is set up, so to speak, as a kind of physics of human 
events. His chief object consists of the given facts and empiri­
cal events that are not deducible ordine geometrico and appear as 
data ascertainable experientially. For the Historiker, “history is 
mere empiricism; it has only to provide the facts and all of its evi­
dence can be adduced only factually.”42 The argument is central in 
GZ, but is also expressed in the crepuscular Staatslehre 1813, where 
Fichte writes the following:
What is history in general? We start from the best known and gen­
eral. It offers a datum, as contingent, i.e. not based on any law, cannot 
be known a priori.43
History, then, is related to the dimensions of what is, in essence, 
contingent, and non -deducible a priori, i.e. with the objectification 
of free human practice. As such, these are contingent and not ne­
cessitated, and therefore present themselves as non ­deducible by 
philosophical reasoning. They can only be reconstructed empirical­
ly, as the factual objectivised product of freedom.
The GZ insist on a clear division of tasks, assumptions and in­
terests between the two different vocations of the historian and phi­
losopher. This is what the GZ themselves explicitly define as “the 
long ­running dispute between philosophy and history.”44
In addition to the already mentioned second lesson of the Bes­
timmung des Gelehrten of Jena in 1794, it is also to be found in the 
centre of Beitrag and its considerations on the scope weltgeschicht‑
lich of the French Revolution. So wrote Fichte pages of Beitrag:
41 GA, I, 8, f. 301.
42 GA, I, 8, f. 301.
43 SW, IV, f. 460.
44 GA, I, 8, f. 306.
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Experience in itself is a box full of characters thrown confusedly on 
each other; only the human spirit is what brings a sense in this chaos, 
from which they put together an Iliad here and there a historical dra­
ma in the genre of Schenkert.45
Albeit metaphorically, Fichte is here thematizing the difference – 
later developed further – between the patient and accurate recollec­
tion of the events and the ability, not deducible from mere empiri­
cal sequence of events, to give meaning to those events; in the sense 
that ­as we must insist – it can not be derived from the events them­
selves empirically and that, at the same time, it is the only guaran­
tee that they do not become disconnected in pure episodic nature 
of their occurrence.
According to an issue that, as noted by Reinhart Koselleck,46 fea­
tures prominently in the debate of the time, Fichte uses the image 
of the letters of the alphabet and the novel. The individual histori­
cal events collected by Historiker are the equivalent of the letters of 
the alphabet. In itself, not sufficient to create a completed novel, en­
dowed with sense. For this to happen, the letters are certainly nec­
essary, but not sufficient. Areas should be carefully linked together 
via a sense that cannot be derived from them and which, nonethe­
less, could not express themselves in their absence.
It is up to the philosopher then to impose the rites ­of ­passage 
narrative structure on history as a process endowed with meaning, 
where individual events must be seen as parts of a whole that can 
return them their full meaning, which they, taken in and of them­
selves, are without.47
Beyond the metaphor of the book, it is crucial to emphasize that 
Fichte, from the days of Beitrag, distinguishes between tasks of 
the historian and those of the philosopher, assigning the second 
45 J. G. Fichte, Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die 
französische Revolution, 1793–1794; SW, VI, f. 70.
46 R. Koselleck, word Geschichte, [in:] R. Koselleck, W. Conze and O. Brunner, 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch ‑sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, Stuttgart 1972–1997, 9 vol., II, pp. 677 ss.
47 R. Koselleck, word Geschichte, op. cit., pp. 678 ss.
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undoubtedly superior importance, but not to deny the importance 
of the first. Picardi has, in this regard, spoken – especially in ref­
erence to the GZ, which take up the theme, (albeit in a framework 
that shall decidedly become the core of Beitrag) – of a “rigid divi­
sion of labour between the positive historian and philosopher, with 
a clear subordination of the first to the second.”48
The philosopher outlines a priori the Bildungsroman of mankind, 
using some of the “letters” made available by the valuable work of 
the historian, but without relying on them. His work remains free 
and, in its basic structure, independent of all experience. Again in the 
words of Picardi: “to the empirical historian Fichte assigns only 
the task of verifying and transmitting facts,”49 whereas the philo­
sopher, however, is entrusted with the duty of deciphering the hi­
eroglyphs of the historical dynamic, its immanent sense, compared 
to which individual events are nothing more than pieces of evidence.
Without the a priori perspective of philosopher, empirical facts 
remain silent, just like the letters of the alphabet not connected in 
order to form a work of meaning. It is also, we could say in the wake 
of Lauth,50 a transcendental vision of the historical course, in fa­
vour of which the a priori vision makes intelligible those historical 
facts that, in its absence, would remain “blind experience,” letters 
disjointed and meaningless.
Since the early writings, Fichte believes what the GZ express­
es in the clearest and most explicit form: the work of historians is 
insufficient, because, in their Geschichtsschreibung, they are de­
prived of a holistic theory, capable of transcending the narrow pa­
rameters of the empirical.51
For their part, the philosophers are able to decipher, behind the 
rhapsody of chaotic events, a deep unity, in turn able, once under­
48 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., p. 57.
49 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., p. 57.
50 See R. Lauth, Il pensiero trascendentale della libertà: interpretazioni di Fichte, 
ed. by M. Ivaldo, Milano 1996, pp. 43 ss.
51 SW, VI, f. 68. See R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia: la filosofia della storia di 
Fichte, op. cit., pp. 23–72; C. De Pascale, Vivere in società, agire nella storia: libertà, 
diritto, storia in Fichte, Milano 2001, pp. 101 ss.
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stood, to give an account of individual events apparently unrelat­
ed. So in GZ:
Conceiving in clear concepts what is absolute, universal and eter­
nally equal to itself in guidance of the human race, is that of the philo­
sopher. Establishing the facts of the ever precarious and changeable 
sphere on which it advances that stable course, is that of the historian, 
from whom the philosopher recalls the passage of discoveries.52
Hence the firm conviction of the GZ about the fact that “the par­
ticular historical fact can be understood only through ‘history in 
general’, that is, the a priori construction attainable by the philos­
opher.”53 As has been suggested, in GZ and other texts in which ad­
dress the Geschichtsschreibung, “the recognition of this positive role 
and indispensable activity of the historical empirical is joined to the 
belief that it is not self -sufficient, but represents only the base ma­
terial for a work of interpretation that requires as a prerequisite an 
a priori key.”54 In the GZ, this perspective is maintained and, fur­
ther, set out in more articulated form, from a fully transcendental 
point of view, that at the time of Beitrag was still missing.
It should then be remembered that already in the pages of Bei‑
trag Fichte had explicitly expounded this thesis, now more system­
atically set out in GZ. Thus he wrote about the importance assigning 
custody of history to the universalizing action of the philosopher55:
It’s necessary to be entrusted to the care of the true philosopher, so 
that they may give easy proof that, in this colourful puppet show, which 
attracts your eye with its colours, all avenues have been tried and none 
led to the goal, and so you cease to discredit his way, the way of ratio­
52 GA, I, 8, pp. 305–306.
53 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
f. 17.
54 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
f. 57.
55 See S. Azzaro, Politica e storia in Fichte, op. cit., p. 46.
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nal principles, in comparison to your own, the way of the blind experi­
ment; It must be entrusted to his care, so he uses it to draw in red some 
letters, in the alphabet that you have to learn, so that you can recognize 
the colour for now, until finally you have learned to recognize them by 
their intrinsic character.56
Where the eyes of the historian record the individual standalone 
letters, the lenses of interpretation of the philosopher are able to put 
them together and build propositions which concentrate the mean­
ing of the great book of history.
The simple evenemential narrative, typical of historians, must 
therefore give way to the work of the philosopher, whose interests 
orbit around the problem of the significance of historical happen­
ing uniformly understood as a carrier of an immanent sense, and 
can justify even individual events.
3. Particular historical, universal philosophical
Since the early writings, the assumption – to which Fichte always 
remains faithful – of the division of labour between historians and 
philosophers, with the assignment of primacy to the latter, does not 
imply in any way a rejection of the role of Historiker, as sometimes 
some interpreters have argued unjustifiably.57
Such prejudice, based on excessive faith attributed to the previ­
ously recalled anecdote that the thinker of Rammenau would rather 
count peas than study history, is found, for example, in Christoph 
Asmuth and his work Metaphysik und Historie beautiful JG Fichte58 
(2003), and then also in Klaus ­Michael Kodalle and in his essay on 
Das Stellenwert der Historiographie im Kontext des Fichtheschen 
56 SW, VI, f. 68. See K. M. Kodalle, Das Stellenwert der Historiographie im Kon‑
text des Fichtheschen Geschichtsdenkens “Fichte ­Studien” 11 (1997), pp. 247–280.
57 See K. M. Kodalle, Das Stellenwert der Historiographie im Kontext des Ficht‑
heschen Geschichtsdenkens, op. cit., 279–280.
58 C. Asmuth, Metaphysik und Historie bei J. G. Fichte, op. cit., pp. 145–158.
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Geschichtsdenkens59 (1997). These are very different texts, in his­
toriographical assumptions and conclusions, but they are united 
by the write ­down of the historical narrative in the work of Fichte.
In contrast to the interpretations of Asmuth and Kodalle, we 
know that Fichte, within certain limits, always valued work of His‑
toriker, considering it essential, if not alone sufficient. As we have 
seen, following an interpretative line that virtually connects Bei‑
trag to GZ and Staatslehre, only the a priori vision which is the hall­
mark of Wissenschaftslehrer can assign the full meaning to factual 
data. This is, after all, merited by the historian’s skill in collecting 
data with adept care and precision: the history of historians – as 
WL 1804 puts it – corresponds to the “pure understanding of the 
multiple as such, in its factuality.”60
This is not to deny, of course, that, in several places of his work, 
Fichte ends up outlining unilaterally, simplistically and almost in 
caricature the historian’s task, presenting it as a simple display – 
impartial and unthinking – of events. Thus, for example, in the 
ninth Vorlesung of GZ:
From this it follows certainly, as it must, that the collator of sim­
ple facts (der Sammler der blossen Facten), whose office, for all its op­
position to philosophy, it is not insignificant, but extremely respectable 
(höchst ehrwürdig), if only It is exercised properly. These have absolute­
ly no support, no theme and no real fixed point outside of the succes­
sion of the years and centuries, without reference to their content; and 
he shall enter all that is historically established in one of these periods. 
He is a chronicler (und alles, was in einer dieser Zeitepochen historisch 
auszumitteln ist, muss er angeben. Er ist Annalist).61
“Collator of simple facts,” and lacking any “theme” or “fixed point” 
outside of mere succession in the order of time, the Historiker – al­
59 K. M. Kodalle, Das Stellenwert der Historiographie im Kontext des Fichthe‑
schen Geschichtsdenkens, op. cit., pp. 274–280.
60 GA, II, 8, f. 8.
61 GA, I, 8, f. 305.
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though presented so incontrovertibly in simplistic reductionism – 
plays, for GZ, a role that is “highly respectable,” by serving the uni­
versalizing action of the philosopher. This means, then, that for 
Fichte between the two figures exists a relationship of undeniable 
diversity, but also necessary cooperation.
The superior wisdom of the philosopher does not imply or jus­
tify, for Fichte, its reoccupation of the role of the historian. on the 
contrary, the first is called to avail himself of the empirical details 
and facts collated by the historian, to be able, in this way to sup­
port the a priori vision of the weltgeschichte.
It’s certain that, as suggested by Picardi,62 Fichte, from begin­
ning to end of his Denkweg, limits the usefulness of historical knowl­
edge only to the scholars: that is, to those who know how to furnish 
it with the philosophical view: as if, in fact, historical knowledge, 
though essential, would acquire its validity only if accompanied by 
the vision of the philosopher and placed under the guardianship of 
his a priori gaze.
As has been suggested,63 in outline ng the tasks of the historian 
and his work of Geschichtsschreibung, GZ does nothing but repeat, 
albeit in an original way, the central thesis of the then dominant 
historiographical model of “pragmatic history,” i.e. the historical in­
vestigation according to the theory of causation.
In this regard, however, its necessary to pay close attention to 
the words, to avoid misunderstandings that would compromise the 
understanding of speech. In the ninth lesson of GZ, Fichte describes 
pragmatic history as “historical art,” using an expression that Schell­
ing, in Vorlesungen über die Methode des Akademischen Studiums 
(1803), used, but with a diametrically opposed sense.64 In particu­
lar, in the text of 1803, Schelling had targeted strictly pragmatic 
history, opposing to it the method of a “historical art” differently un­
62 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
p. 68.
63 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
p. 55.
64 F. W. J. Schelling, Vorlesungen über die Methode des Akademischen Studiums, 
[in:] F. W. J. Schelling, Ausgewählte Schriften, Frankfurt a.M. 1985, II, pp. 310–311.
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derstood, and more specifically conceived as an artistic treatment of 
the historical material, according to a method in some ways not far 
from what would later be proposed by Humboldt in Über die Auf‑
gabe des Geschichtsschreibers (1821). For its part, Fichte, as seen, 
for the “historical art” means “pragmatic history,” conceived in the 
manner stated above.65
The difference between the historian and the philosopher, as al­
ready suggested, is in the fact that the first remains permanently 
attached to the empirical plane, while the second refers to it only in 
passing, to support his a priori vision. In the words of the ninth les­
son of GZ, “the simple empirical historian must faithfully conceive 
all these elements, as they are found, and juxtapose them. To the 
philosopher, who uses history to that intent which here is ours, be­
longs only the last element, truly civilization in its living progres­
sion, and puts to one side everything else.”66 So writes Fichte in the 
ninth GZ, specifying the use that he himself is making of the his­
torical narrative as part of his lectures:
To state the very real relationship (das wahre Verhältniss) that 
runs between the philosopher and the historian: the philosopher deigns 
to tell the truth of history only to the extent that it serves its pur-
pose (nur, inwiefern sie zu seinem Zwecke dient), ignoring all that is 
not needed in this regard. And frankly I announce that I shall not avail 
myself of such in following my research.67
It is also in the light of this strict disciplinary division of labour 
between the historian and philosopher that, in GZ, Fichte is tak­
ing part in one of the great debates that animated the last decades 
of the eighteenth century about the possibility of establishing what 
was the method suitable for the interpretation of Genesis.
Historical evenemential inquiry can not examine in any way the 
beginnings of human history, as they cannot be established empiri­
65 See K. Okada, Fichte und Schelling, “Fichte ­Studien” 21 (2003), pp. 45–52.
66 GA, I, 8, p. 305.
67 GA, I, 8, p. 305.
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cally: “if man was created in time, then, at least with his conscience, 
he did not take part, and he could not see how the past is not being, 
nor can pass it down to posterity as a posteriori fact.”68 Nor is it pos­
sible to make concessions to the theories – and here Fichte is target­
ing both the Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae, and the Encyclopédie – that 
classify homo sapiens in the order of primates, making a “descen­
dent ultimately from an orang ­utang, a Leibniz or Kant.”69
Philosophy can instead seek to venture into this field removed 
from the empirical factuality, precisely because of the fact that, ac­
cording to a priori oriented schemes, it is not required to give an 
account of concrete historical experience and the level of empirical 
factuality.
In particular, the philosophical view is called to accept a mythi­
cal explanation of the book of Genesis as only possible explanation.70 
So in the ninth lesson of GZ:
What are now the conditions of the empirical existence, what then is 
a prerequisite for the mere possibility of a history in general, and what 
is to be put before everything, before the story can even find its beginning, 
are matters for the philosopher. […] Neither the philosopher nor the his­
torian, therefore, have something to say about the origin of the world 
and of mankind (über den Ursprung der Welt und des Menschenge‑
schlechtes), since there is generally no source, but only the ‘only timeless 
and necessary. Being’ But the philosopher must give an account of the 
factual conditions of existence (die Bedingungen des factischen Da‑
seyns) as precisely excess of any factual existence and every empirical.71
Genesis, in fact, is for Fichte a mere “philosopheme,”72 devoid of 
any historical value.73 It, however, is heuristically fruitful, because 
68 GA, I, 8, p. 298.
69 GA, I, 8, p. 299.
70 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
pp. 177–178.
71 GA, I, 8, pp. 297–298.
72 GA, I, 8, p. 298.
73 GA, I, 8, p. 298.
56 dr Diego Fusaro
it allows you to bring reason to bear, albeit only conjecturally, on 
historical events.
If, as has been shown, for Fichte the historian deals with the 
factual, where the philosopher is of the order of a priori, and there­
fore also of “what is a prerequisite for the possibility of every sto­
ry,”74 then it is consistent according to his responsibility for fixing 
the elements of Urgeschichte, i.e. the pre ­historical dimension that 
should be taken as a precondition for any ability to give an account 
of the empirically verifiable course of history.75 Again, only the phi­
losopher can legitimately deal with Genesis.
The GZ try to set some of the conditions that it is the task of the 
philosopher to identify76. Among these, the first corresponds to 
the existence of humanity. The birth of the latter escapes the grasp 
of historical survey, because humanity is, by its nature, a manifes­
tation of the phenomenal “only timeless and necessary Being.”77
The second one corresponds to social life. It too is an originat­
ing fact of history, not be investigated empirically. There is, in this 
regard, an interesting conceptual reorientation in respect to the 
Jena years, that here we can only mention and on which Picardi 
has widely focused attention78: in a strengthening of the communi­
ty perspective identified by Aldo Masullo as one of the most specif­
ic features of Fichtean reflection,79 in GZ it is postulated as a pre­
condition and as original fact of history which was, for example, in 
Naturrecht of Jena (1796–1797) deduced on a social impulse basis. 
Finally, the third condition focused in GZ corresponds to language, 
condicio sine qua non of any forms of social coexistence of finite ra­
tional entities, according to a theme, already developed in Von der 
Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache (1795), and to be 
74 GA, I, 8, p. 298.
75 GA, I, 8, p. 298.
76 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
p. 180.
77 GA, I, 8, p. 296.
78 R. Picardi, Il concetto e la storia. La filosofia della storia di Fichte, op. cit., 
pp. 132 ss.
79 See A. Masullo, Fichte: l’intersoggettività e l’originario, Napoli 1986, p. 140.
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returned to a central position in the subsequent Reden an die deut‑
sche Nation.
In this way, Fichte further clarifies the by no means linear rela­
tionship established between, especially in GZ, historians and phi­
losophers. Nor should it, in this regard, be forgotten that the lessons 
of the 1804–1805 open precisely with a discussion of this delicate 
theoretical problem, which reveals the absolute centrality that it 
occupies within the geschichtsphilosophisch reflections of the Ram­
menau thinker. After outlining, with a detailed table of contents, 
the general plan, outlining in broad strokes the content of the sev­
enteen Vorlesungen of which it consists, Fichte, with the first les­
son, immediately enters in medias res, addressing the issue of the 
relationship between historians and philosophers.
If it is true – as the first lesson says – that the GZ develop “a sin­
gle thought which in itself constitutes an organic unity,”80 it’s nec­
essary, from the start, to clear up any possible misunderstanding. 
The GZ constitute a work structurally geschichtsphilosophisch, and 
therefore not as an empirical history text. More precisely, “what you 
are promised in these conferences is a philosophical framework of 
the present age.”81
This means, in fact, that the Vorlesungen as heard from the au­
dience or the book in the hands of the reader should not be under­
stood as the outcome of the work of the “mere empiricist,”82 which 
is limited to the contingency and factual description.
If, for Historiker, individuals and their empirically proven ac­
tions are of paramount importance, for Wissenschaftslehrer they 
are not in the foreground, for he accesses a deeper dimension, lo­
cated below the chaotic streaming and sprawling of events and ma­
jor historical figures:
Individuals vanish entirely in the eyes of the philosopher 
(Individuen verschwinden nun aber vor dem vollends Blicke des Philo‑
80 GA, I, 8, p. 195.
81 GA, I, 8, p. 196.
82 GA, I, 8, p. 196.
58 dr Diego Fusaro
sophen) and they all converge for him in one great community. Its fea­
ture captures everything with an acumen and consistency that may 
never reach the eternal wave of reality; as it does not touch any per­
son, without ever falling into the portrait, it remains in the sphere of 
the idealized painting.83
From the first pages of this overture of GZ, Fichte insists on the 
already mentioned difference between the philosopher and histori­
an, making clear the need, from the first, to operate regardless of 
experience from which the latter can never distance itself:
The philosopher that poses the task of such a description will seek 
a concept of the age regardless of any experience (unabhängig von 
aller Erfahrung einen Begriff des Zeitalters), which as a concept can not 
appear in any experience, and will expose the ways in which this con­
cept appears in the experience, as necessary phenomena of this age 
(nothwendigen Phänomene dieses Zeitalters).84
For this same reason, having to a priori outline the sense of his­
tory, the philosopher – according to Fichte – “has absolutely no need 
of any experience for his office, that he exercises philosophy, remain­
ing strictly within its boundaries, without regard to a any experi­
ence and simply a priori.”85 So that he “must be able to describe in 
advance the whole era and all possible ages that are included,”86 de­
ducing rationally. For this, the GZ must be understood as a work of 
philosophy of history and not of Geschichtsschreibung.
As pointed out, the level of empirical history can, at best, help 
the philosopher to support his argument and to understand what 
actual stage of history, designed from the outset, humanity is in at 
the present time. The philosopher is, therefore, called upon to take 
care not of the individual episodic events, but on their conditions of 
83 GA, I, 8, p. 203.
84 GA, I, 8, p. 196.
85 GA, I, 8, p. 196.
86 GA, I, 8, p. 196.
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possibility and the sense that secretly connects them, deciphering 
the hieroglyphs of the historical dynamic qua talis regardless of the 
size of the prosaic empirical factuality87:
The philosopher, as far as he is concerned with history, follows a pri­
ori that continuous thread of the universal plan which for him is clear 
regardless of any history (geht jenem a priori fortlaufenden Faden des 
Weltplanes nach, der ihm klar ist ohne to Geschichte); and the use he 
makes of history is by no means to prove something by it, since his the­
ses have already been proven before and independently of any history 
(seine Sätze und schon früher unabhängig von aller erwiesen Geschichte 
sind), but it is just to illustrate the history and to demonstrate the actu­
al life that one understands without recourse to history (was auch ohne 
sich die Geschichte versteht).88
The philosopher, then, ponders rationally the concepts of the age, 
putting it in connection with the historical totum and drawing it ra­
tionally, always on a transcendental plane, to the knowledge of the 
whole, so that its parts join as a consistent development of the uni­
fied idea, and therefore the logic of history as such.
The historian has to collect the fullest extent possible, accurate 
and correct data, because his is empirical knowledge. But “this way 
of proceeding is not up to the philosopher, which would be abso­
lutely reprehensible in the simple historical inquiry.”89 As with the 
historian, so the philosopher must respect the truth, but not in 
the same way.
The first has to recount exactly what happened, while the sec­
ond is called to reconstruct the truth: the meaning of the histori­
cal process. He must not lie, but can not be accused of ommision: 
in fact, “he would be worthy of criticism only if he has claimed that 
87 See C. De Pascale, Vivere in società, agire nella storia. Libertà, diritto, storia 
in Fichte, op. cit., p. 104.
88 GA, I, 8, p. 304.
89 GA, I, 8, p. 305.
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which never happened,” but “does not deserve blame if he is silent 
because it certainly happened.”90
For his part, the historian collects exactly the empirical phe­
nomena in their evenemential succession, but is not able to coordi­
nate them in the light of the principle that makes them possible, 
and of which the Historiker remains clueless: “everything that be­
comes the principle of the phenomenon, becomes precisely what is 
lost in the phenomenon, and becomes invisible to the external sense 
and is not perceived even to the sharpest reflection,”91 which is the 
reflection of the philosophical order.
Summary
Science of knowledge and historical experience. The role of 
historiography in Fichte’s Grundzüge
This paper sets out as its objective the exploration of some of the key passages 
and most relevant theoretical plexuses of the Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen 
Zeitalters (1806) by Johann Gottlieb Fichte devoted to the theme of historical 
narrative and, more generally, of historiography. In particular, we will first of 
all aim to show the specific status of Historie. Secondly, we will try to outline 
the differences that Grundzüge establishes between the functions of Wissen‑
schaftslehrer and those of Historiker, in an attempt to show, at the same time, 
the nexus linking the two and the activities they perform.
Keywords Fichte, history, science, philosophy, action
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